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In the proof-theoretic study of logic, the notion of normal proof has been understood and
investigated as a metalogical property. Usually we formulate a system of logic, identify
a class of proofs as normal proofs, and show that every proof in the system reduces to
a corresponding normal proof. This paper develops a system of modal logic that is capable
of expressing the notion of normal proof within the system itself, thereby making normal
proofs an inherent property of the logic. Using a modality  to express the existence of
a normal proof, the system provides a means for both recognizing and manipulating its
own normal proofs. We develop the system as a sequent calculus with the implication
connective ⊃ and the modality , and prove the cut elimination theorem. From the
sequent calculus, we derive two equivalent natural deduction systems.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the proof-theoretic study of logic, the notion of normal proof has played a central role. Conceptually a normal proof
is a proof that contains no indirect reasoning and provides direct evidence of the truth it asserts. In a formal system of
logic, a normal proof is a proof that contains no “detour” which introduces a connective or modality (e.g., implication ⊃ ,
conjunction ∧ , and necessity ) only to immediately eliminate it. In this sense, a normal proof is minimal in size because
it does not reduce to another proof (irrespective of the size of its representation).
Traditionally the notion of normal proof has been understood and investigated as a metalogical property. Usually we
formulate a system of logic, identify a class of proofs as normal proofs, and show that every proof in the system reduces to
a corresponding (unique) normal proof. The result is then exploited in examining other metalogical properties of the system
such as unprovability of inconsistency (⊥) and solving practical problems such as building a theorem prover. Thus, although
not recognized by the system itself, normal proofs serve as an indispensable tool for succinctly characterizing the system
and developing practical applications.
This paper develops a system of logic that is capable of expressing the notion of normal proof within the system itself. That
is, the system has a means for internalizing and reasoning about its own normal proofs, thereby making normal proofs an
inherent property of the logic (as opposed to a metalogical property). Thus the system is reﬂective [1] in that it is self-aware
of its own normal proofs. To the best of our knowledge, no such system has been proposed.
We formulate the logic in the judgmental style of Martin-Löf [2,3] which distinguishes between judgments and proposi-
tions. A judgment represents an object of knowledge and a proof of it allows us to know the object of knowledge. If we do
not have a proof, the judgment is not part of our knowledge. In contrast, a proposition conveys no knowledge in itself, but
if A is known to be a proposition, we know what counts as a veriﬁcation of its truth. That is, we can check whether a proof
of the truth of A is indeed valid or not. Thus the notion of judgment is independent of (and precedes in priority) the notion
of proposition.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: gla@postech.ac.kr (S. Park), genilhs@postech.ac.kr (H. Im).0890-5401/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ic.2010.09.010
1520 S. Park, H. Im / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1519–1535In order to deal with both ordinary proofs and normal proofs within the same system of logic, we use two separate
judgments A true and A↑ where A is a proposition, or simply a formula. A true is a truth judgment whose proof is an
ordinary proof and may reduce to another proof. A↑, adopted from the intercalation calculus of Byrnes [4], is a normality
judgment whose proof is a normal proof and does not reduce to another proof. As A↑ states a different “mode” of truth,
namely truth with a normal proof, we develop the system as “modal” logic [5] by deﬁning a new modality  to capture
the metalogical property of A true expressed in A↑. As shown by Pfenning and Davies [3], the judgmental style lends itself
particularly well to the development of systems of modal logic. In our case, we use  to internalize a normality judgment
within a truth judgment1:
A↑
A true I
A technical challenge is to deal with the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem. The rule I internalizes A↑ within
A true and thus expands the set of truth judgments. At the same time, it also expands the set of normality judgments
because the existence of A true implies the existence of a corresponding normality judgment A↑. Now the rule I
allows us to deduce another truth judgment A true, which introduces yet another normality judgment A↑, and so
on. As is the case in similar reﬂective systems [6,7,1], the problem is quite subtle, especially because we wish to develop
a simple system using a single modality  instead of an inﬁnite tower of modalities (e.g., A↑11 A true ,
A↑2
2 A↑1 ,
A↑3
3 A↑2 , . . .).
We develop a sequent calculus with the implication connective ⊃ and the modality , and prove the cut elimination
theorem. Then we derive two natural deduction system equivalent to the sequent calculus (one for deducing normality
judgments and another for deducing truth judgments). Our ﬁnding is that in order for the system to be useful and inter-
esting,  should be used to internalize not a normality judgment in the standard sense, but a weaker form of normality
judgment whose proof may use hypotheses of normality judgments.
From a philosophical point of view, our system is superﬁcially similar to provability logic [8] in that it is concerned
with provability of judgments and is also reﬂective. Its real nature is different, however, because the modality  expresses
not the general notion of provability but only the existence of a special form of proof, namely a weaker form of normality
judgment. For example, (A ⊃ A) true is provable in our system, but not in provability logic if  is used as the provability
modality. (In provability logic, ((A ⊃ A)) ⊃ A true is given as an axiom.)  is also different from the necessity modal-
ity  in modal logic:  is concerned with proofs valid in every context, which are not necessarily normal. For example,
(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) true is not provable in our system whereas (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B) true is provable in modal logic
like S4.
While it is interesting mainly from a theoretical point of view, our system has indeed been inspired by a practical type
system for parallel functional languages [9]. The type system uses a modality  to indicate whether the result of evaluating
a given term contains mutable references or not. As a term always evaluates to a value, the type system is inherently
capable of recognizing values, which are a special class of irreducible terms. By applying the Curry–Howard isomorphism,
we obtain a system of logic recognizing a special class of proofs that can be represented by values. Our system attempts
to further generalize the correspondence by using the modality  to recognize fully normal proofs. Thus it may serve as
a proof-theoretic foundation for type systems that distinguish between different classes of terms belonging to the same
type.
We begin in Section 2 by introducing the problem of internalizing normality judgments with the modality .
2. Modality  for internalizing normal proofs
This section speciﬁes our goal and explains technical diﬃculties in detail. Because of the peculiarity of internalizing
normality judgments with the new modality , we need to introduce some new concepts not found in the conventional
proof-theoretic study of logic. We consider a fragment of propositional logic with the implication connective ⊃ only, since
all interesting challenges arise from the interaction between  and ⊃ .
1 To internalize a judgment J means to represent the knowledge expressed in J with a truth judgment using a speciﬁc connective or modality. For
example, we internalize a hypothetical judgment
A true
.
.
.
B true
within a truth judgment A ⊃ B true using the implication connective ⊃ . In modal logic, we internalize within a truth judgment A true a truth judgment
A true that is valid in every context.
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Consider the following natural deduction system Ntrue:
A true
x
...
B true
A ⊃ B true ⊃Ix
A ⊃ B true A true
B true
⊃E
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Ntrue
A proof of a truth judgment A true is normal if it contains no “detour” in which an introduction of ⊃ (by the introduction
rule ⊃I) is immediately followed by its elimination (by the elimination rule ⊃E).2 We can always remove such a detour by
replacing a hypothesis with another existing proof 3:
A true
x
...
B true
A ⊃ B true ⊃Ix DA true
B true
⊃E −→
D
A true
...
B true
Prawitz [10] refers to the sequence of formulae in a detour as a maximal segment and deﬁnes a normal proof as a proof
with no maximal segment. Instead of characterizing normal proofs in terms of absence of detours or maximal segments, we
adopt the intercalation calculus of Byrnes [4] which can be thought of as using a new form of judgment to directly deﬁne
normal proofs.
In addition to truth judgments, our system uses two new basic judgments: normality judgments and neutrality judgments.
We use a normality judgment A↑ for a normal proof of A true. The intuition is that a proof of A↑ requires a bottom–up
application of an introduction rule (such as ⊃I). We use a neutrality judgment A↓ for a neutral proof of A true. A neutral
proof is either a hypothesis or obtained as a top–down application of an elimination rule (such as ⊃E) to another neutral
proof. When A↓ and A↑ meet in the middle, we complete a normal proof. Thus a proof of a normality judgment C↑ has
the following structure (which clearly shows that a normal proof contains no detour):
The following natural deduction system N↑↓ gives the inference rules for normality and neutrality judgments:
A↓ u
...
B↑
A ⊃ B↑ ⊃I
u↑
A ⊃ B↓ A↑
B↓ ⊃E↓
A↓
A↑ ↓↑
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
N↑↓
Note that A↓ is strictly stronger than A↑ because of the rule ↓↑.
2 For the fragment of propositional logic with ⊃ only, this deﬁnition of normal proof is accurate. For full propositional logic, this deﬁnition needs to be
extended.
3 We write
D
for a proof D of A true.A true
1522 S. Park, H. Im / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1519–1535The rules in N↑↓ may be thought of as specifying a special strategy in the search of proofs of truth judgments in Ntrue ,
since a proof of A↑ can be converted to a proof of A true by replacing all normality and neutrality judgments in it with
truth judgments. Hence A↑ is stronger than A true. The normalization theorem [10], however, states that Ntrue and N↑↓ are
in fact equivalent: A true is provable in Ntrue if and only if A↑ is provable in N↑↓ .
Proposition 2.1 (Ntrue = N↑↓). A true in Ntrue if and only if A↑ in N↑↓ .
In order to deﬁne the modality  capturing the metalogical property of A true expressed in A↑, we combine Ntrue and
N↑↓ via the following rules:
A↑
A true I
A true
A↑ v
...
B true
B true
Ev
The rule I internalizes a normality judgment A↑ within a truth judgment using the modality . The rule E enables us
to extract the normality judgment A↑ internalized into a truth judgment A true. Note that like a hypothesis A true of
a truth judgment, a hypothesis A↑ of a normality judgment can be interpreted literally. That is, it just assumes a proof of
a normality judgment A↑.
The two rules I and E satisfy local soundness and completeness in the following sense [3]:
• An introduction followed by an elimination can be reduced.
D
A↑
A true I
A↑ v
...
B true
B true
Ev reduction−→
D
A↑
...
B true
• A proof of A true can be expanded into another proof of A true via an elimination by the rule E.
EA true
expansion
−→
EA true
A↑ v
A true I
A true E
v
Now that we have inference rules for truth judgments A true, we also need corresponding inference rules for normality
and neutrality judgments:
A↑
A↑ I↑
A↓
A↑ w
...
B↑
B↑ E
w↓
The rule I↑ , derived from the rule I, explains how to build a new proof of A↑. The rule E↓ , derived from the
rule E, explains how to exploit an existing proof of A↓. Without these rules, the system does not fully capture the
notion of normal proof because not every formula A is allowed in A true (e.g., A = A′).
We write Ntrue for the natural deduction system consisting of all the inference rules given above; we also write N
↑↓
 for
the natural deduction system consisting of N↑↓ , I↑ , and E↓ , which deals only with normality and neutrality judgments:
Ntrue = Ntrue + I,E + N↑↓
N↑↓ = N↑↓ + I↑,E↓
Our goal is to make Ntrue equivalent to N
↑↓
 , revising both systems as necessary, in the same way that Ntrue is equivalent
to N↑↓:
Conjecture 2.2 (Ntrue = N↑↓ ). A true in Ntrue if and only if A↑ in N↑↓ .
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The relationship between Ntrue and N
↑↓
 in Conjecture 2.2 is considerably more complex than between Ntrue and N↑↓ in
Proposition 2.1, since Ntrue subsumes N
↑↓
 whereas Ntrue is separate from N↑↓ . In particular, Conjecture 2.2 makes sense only
if every proof D of A↑ in N↑↓ is a reﬁnement of a certain proof E of A true so that D transforms into E by replacing some
normality or neutrality judgments in it with truth judgments. This requirement holds trivially in N↑↓ , but not in N↑↓ as it
stands now. For example, the following proof of A ⊃ A↑ has no corresponding proof of A ⊃ A true:
A↓ u
A↑ ↓↑
A↑ I↑
A ⊃ A↑ ⊃I
u↑ −→
A true
x
A↑ ???
A true I
A ⊃ A true ⊃Ix
The problem with Ntrue consists in the rule I↑: not every normality judgment A↑ is eligible as the premise of the
rule I↑ , which, however, places no restriction on its premise. To see why, think of the rule I as opening up an “inner
region” starting from its premise A↑ within an “outer region” ending with its conclusion A true4:
The two regions are separate from each other because the inner region proves a normality judgment whereas the outer
region consists only of truth judgments. Since the rule I↑ reﬁnes the rule I, its premise cannot reside in the same region
as its conclusion. The rule I↑ in its current form, however, fails to specify that its premise and conclusion reside in separate
regions. In the example above, the hypothesis A↓ u resides in the same region as the conclusion of the rule I↑ , which
implies that the premise of the rule I↑ also resides in the same region.
Thus we can imagine that there is an inﬁnite stack of regions and that every judgment in a valid proof resides in
a certain unique region, i.e., no conﬂict arises in assigning a region to each judgment. The region where a judgment resides
is determined as follows:
• A hypothesis introduced by the rule ⊃I or ⊃I↑ resides in the same region as the conclusion.
• The premise of the rule I or I↑ resides in the next inner region.
• A hypothesis introduced by the rule E or E↓ resides in the next inner region.
Then, for example, an attempt to prove A ⊃ A↑ ends up with a conﬂict in assigning a region to the judgment A↑:
A↓ u
A↑ ↓↑
A↑ I↑
A ⊃ A↑ ⊃I
u↑
}
outer region
} outer region? inner region?
outer region {
Another subtle issue with Ntrue is that a proof of A↑ does not necessarily correspond to a normal proof of A true in
the standard sense, i.e., bottom–up applications of introduction rules connected with top–down applications of elimination
rules. The reason is that with the inclusion of the rules E and E↓ , a proof of A↑ may use hypotheses of normality
judgments, in which case it asserts only the possibility of building a normal proof of A true. Such a normal proof can be
obtained by substituting an actual normal proof of B true for each hypothesis B↑ in the proof of A↑.
Thus the challenge now is to reformulate Ntrue so that it properly accounts for the relationship between judgments
residing in different regions and also clearly distinguishes between normal proofs in the standard sense and normal proofs
subject to substitutions. In order to permit judgments residing in different regions, Ntrue uses two separate contexts in
its hypothetical judgments; in order to permit normal proofs subject to substitutions, Ntrue introduces a weaker form of
normality judgments called semi-normality judgments.
For technical reasons, we set out to develop a sequent calculus S (Section 3), which, in comparison with a natural
deduction system, lends itself better to checking the soundness (or consistency) of the system. It is customary to start with
4 Here we do not formally deﬁne the notion of “region” because we introduce it only to help describe the structure of proofs involving normality
judgments.
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however, it is better to consider a sequent calculus before developing a natural deduction system because we need a se-
quent calculus anyway in order to check its soundness. A cut elimination theorem proves that the system is indeed sound
(Section 4). From the sequent calculus, it is routine to derive corresponding natural deduction systems (N↑↓ in Section 5
and Ntrue in Section 6).
3. Sequent calculus S
This section presents a sequent calculus S which augments the sequent calculus for Ntrue with the modality . The
main obstacle to developing S is to identify a form of sequent that is ﬁnite in size, yet expressive enough to allow for
a stack of regions of arbitrary depth. Hence we interpret every sequent relative to a certain hypothetical region, which we
refer to as a reference region.
Let us begin with a sequent Γ −→ C for the sequent calculus for Ntrue . A in Γ is interpreted as A↓ and C as C↑, both
in the reference region. Consider a sequent Γ,A −→ C . Analyzing A↓ creates A↑ in the next inner region (as in the
rule E↓), which does not ﬁt into the present form of sequent. Hence we expand the left side of the sequent with a new
context Ψ such that A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A↑ belonging to the next inner region. For example, the
following rule now makes sense:
Ψ, A;Γ,A −→ C
Ψ ;Γ,A −→ C L
The new form of sequent justiﬁes the following rule:
A atomic
Ψ ;Γ, A −→ A Init
The rule Init (for proving Initial sequents), which corresponds to the rule ↓↑ in N↑↓ , converts a neutrality judgment A↓ into
a normality judgment A↑, both in the reference region. It requires A to be an atomic formula, although the requirement
can be lifted (see Proposition 3.1).
Now we need a rule that uses hypotheses of normality judgments in Ψ . In designing such a rule, we should distinguish
between those proofs that do not use hypotheses in Ψ and thus yield a normality judgment in the standard sense, and
those proofs that use hypotheses in Ψ and thus yield a weaker judgment. Without such a distinction, cut elimination would
fail because a proof of Ψ ;Γ −→ C that uses hypotheses in Ψ may not reveal the structure of a complete proof of C↑, which
is essential to guarantee cut elimination. Thus we are led to use two forms of sequents deﬁned as follows:
• Ψ ;Γ −→ C proves a normality judgment C↑ in the standard sense. A cut elimination theorem (Theorem 4.1) is to be
established for sequents of this form.
• Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C proves a weaker judgment, namely a semi-normality judgment C⇑, whose proof may use hypotheses in Ψ .
A substitution theorem (Theorem 4.2) is to be established for sequents of this form.
In both forms of sequents, A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of a semi-normality judgment A⇑ belonging to the
next inner region. In order to use hypotheses in Ψ , we introduce the following rule Sub (for Substituting semi-normality
judgments) which moves a semi-normality judgment A⇑ from the next inner region to the reference region:
Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ A Sub
We use the modality  to internalize not a normality judgment but a semi-normality judgment in the next inner region.
Using  to internalize a normality judgment is okay, but it renders the system useless because no elimination rule for  is
allowed. In fact, adding an elimination rule for  eventually forces us to use  to internalize a semi-normality judgment.
Thus, for example, the natural deduction system derived from S has the following introduction rule:
An important decision in the design of S is to interpret A in a context Ψ as a hypothesis of A⇑ belonging to not only
the next inner region but also all further inner regions. That is, once a hypothesis of A⇑ is added to the next inner region,
it is copied to all further inner regions as well, effectively coalescing all inner regions. The rationale is that we wish to
design S as a reﬂective system that is aware of its own rule
A⇑
A↑ I↑ , or equivalently, that is aware that A↑ is provable
whenever a proof of A⇑ exists. The new interpretation of Ψ manifests itself as a proof of A ⊃ A↑ to be shown later.
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Ψ ;Γ, A −→ A Init
A atomic
Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ A Init
′
Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ A Sub
Ψ, A;Γ,A −→ C
Ψ ;Γ,A −→ C L
Ψ ; · ⇒ A
Ψ ;Γ −→ A R
Ψ, A;Γ,A ⇒ C
Ψ ;Γ,A ⇒ C L
′ Ψ ; · ⇒ A
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A R
′
Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B −→ A Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B, B −→ C
Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B −→ C ⊃L
Ψ ;Γ, A −→ B
Ψ ;Γ −→ A ⊃ B ⊃R
Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B −→ A Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B, B ⇒ C
Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ C ⊃L
′ Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ B
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A ⊃ B ⊃R
′
Fig. 1. Sequent calculus S .
Because of the decision to coalesce all inner regions, S needs only a single modality  rather than an inﬁnite tower of
modalities 1,2,3, . . . .
Thus we use the following deﬁnition of Ψ ;Γ −→ C and Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C for S:
• A in Ψ denotes a hypothesis of A⇑ belonging to all inner regions.
• A in Γ denotes a neutrality judgment A↓ belonging to the reference region.
• Ψ ;Γ −→ C proves C↑ in the reference region.
• Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C proves C⇑ in the reference region.
Fig. 1 shows the rules in S . We implicitly identify contexts up to structural equivalence (exchange and contraction).
Weakening is also built into the rules Init, Init′ , and Sub. The requirement on the rule Init that A be an atomic formula
ensures that any proof of Ψ ;Γ −→ C eventually decomposes C into its atomic subformulae. A similar requirement is placed
on the rule Init′ , but the rule Sub allows us to prove Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C without analyzing C . The rules L and L′ analyze A↓ in
the reference region and place a hypothesis of A⇑ in all inner regions. The rules R and R′ express that a proof of A↑
or A⇑ requires a proof of A⇑ in the next inner region where Ψ continues to be valid (because it contains hypotheses
belonging to all inner regions) but Γ from the reference region is no longer valid. The ﬁrst premise of the rule ⊃L′ proves
A↑ instead of A⇑, which implies that an analysis of A ⊃ B↓ must be accompanied by a proof of A↑. S satisﬁes the
subformula property and can be shown to be decidable.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that A in the rules Init and Init′ can be any formula. The results serve as evidence of the
completeness of S in the sense that the left rules (such as L and ⊃L) are strong enough to guarantee the provability of
C↑ and C⇑ using the right rules (such as R and ⊃R) after decomposing C into its atomic subformulae. Proposition 3.3
shows that Ψ ;Γ −→ C is stronger than Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C .
Proposition 3.1. ·; A −→ A is derivable for any formula A.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A. We show two interesting cases.
A; · ⇒ A Sub
A;A −→ A R
·;A −→ A L
IH on A
·; A ⊃ B, A −→ A
IH on B
·; A ⊃ B, A, B −→ B
·; A ⊃ B, A −→ B ⊃L
·; A ⊃ B −→ A ⊃ B ⊃R 
Proposition 3.2. ·; A ⇒ A is derivable for any formula A.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A. We show two interesting cases.
A; · ⇒ A Sub
A;A ⇒ A R
′
·;A ⇒ A L
′
Proposition 3.1
·; A ⊃ B, A −→ A
IH on B
·; A ⊃ B, A, B ⇒ B
·; A ⊃ B, A ⇒ B ⊃L′
·; A ⊃ B ⇒ A ⊃ B ⊃R′ 
Proposition 3.3. If Ψ ;Γ −→ C , then Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ ;Γ −→ C . 
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of A; · −→ A. Even ·;Γ ⇒ C does not imply ·;Γ −→ C , as shown in the following example:
A;A ⇒ A Sub
·;A ⇒ A L
′
???
A;A −→ A
·;A −→ A L
The modality  interacts with the implication connective ⊃ in the following ways. First (A ⊃ A)↑ and A ⊃ A⇑
are provable (because ·;A ⇒ A is provable), but A ⊃ A↑ is not provable (because ·;A −→ A is not provable):
A;A ⇒ A Sub
·;A ⇒ A L
′
·; · ⇒ A ⊃ A ⊃R′
·; · −→ (A ⊃ A) R
???
A;A −→ A
·;A −→ A L
·; · −→ A ⊃ A ⊃R
Provability of A ⊃ A⇑ and unprovability of A ⊃ A↑ conform to the design of the modality : a formula A internalizes
not a normality judgment A↑ but a semi-normality judgment A⇑, which may use hypotheses of semi-normality judgments
and is thus weaker than A↑. (Unprovability of A ⊃ A↑ implies unprovability of A ⊃ A true in the natural deduction
system Ntrue .) Second, although A ⊃ A↑ is not provable in general, A ⊃ A↑ is provable, which implies that S is
aware of its own rule
A⇑
A↑ I↑:
???
·; · ⇒ A
·; A −→ A R
·; · −→ A ⊃ A ⊃R
A; · ⇒ A Sub
A; · ⇒ A R
′
A;A −→ A R
·;A −→ A L
·; · −→ A ⊃ A ⊃R
Finally (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)↑ is not provable:
???
A ⊃ B, A; · ⇒ B
A ⊃ B, A;(A ⊃ B),A −→ B R
A ⊃ B;(A ⊃ B),A −→ B L
·;(A ⊃ B),A −→ B L
·;(A ⊃ B) −→ A ⊃ B ⊃R
·; · −→ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) ⊃R
Intuitively we cannot build a proof of B⇑ from hypotheses of A ⊃ B⇑ and A⇑. Instead of A ⊃ B⇑, we need A ⊃ B↓, which
the assumption of (A ⊃ B)↓ fails to provide.
Provability of (A ⊃ A)↑ implies that the modality  is fundamentally different from the modality  in provabil-
ity logic, which rejects (A ⊃ A) true and admits ((A ⊃ A)) ⊃A true as an axiom. Unprovability of (A ⊃ B) ⊃
(A ⊃ B)↑ implies that the modality  is fundamentally different from the necessity modality  in modal logic, since
(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B) true is provable in modal logic like S4.
4. Cut elimination in S
This section proves cut elimination in S which serves as evidence of its soundness. As S uses two disjoint contexts in
a sequent, we consider two different forms of cut elimination. As usual, the main cut elimination theorem analyzes a proof
of A↑ to remove a neutrality judgment A↓:
Theorem 4.1 (Cut elimination).
If Ψ ;Γ −→ A and Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C , then Ψ ;Γ −→ C .
If Ψ ;Γ −→ A and Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ C , then Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C .
In order to remove A in Ψ, A;Γ −→ C or Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C , we have to provide a proof of A⇑ that can be substituted for
a hypothesis of A⇑ residing in the next inner region. Hence the following property is called a substitution theorem rather
than another cut elimination theorem:
Theorem 4.2 (Substitution of semi-normality judgments).
If Ψ ; · ⇒ A and Ψ, A;Γ −→ C , then Ψ ;Γ −→ C.
If Ψ ; · ⇒ A and Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C , then Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C.
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Ψ ;Γ  A↓
Ψ ;Γ  A↑ ↓↑ (A atomic)
Ψ ;Γ  A↓
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑ ↓⇑ (A atomic)
Ψ ; ·  A⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A↑ I↑
Ψ ; ·  A⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑ I⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A↓ Ψ, A;Γ  J
Ψ ;Γ  J E↓ ( J = C↑ or C⇑)
Ψ ;Γ, A  B↑
Ψ ;Γ  A ⊃ B↑ ⊃I↑
Ψ ;Γ, A  B⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A ⊃ B⇑ ⊃I⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A ⊃ B↓ Ψ ;Γ  A↑
Ψ ;Γ  B↓ ⊃E↓
Fig. 2. Natural deduction system N↑↓ .
Note that Ψ ; · ⇒ A can be thought of as proving A⇑ in the next inner region because it uses no neutrality judgment
and every hypothesis contained in Ψ is assumed to be valid in all inner regions.
We ﬁrst prove Theorem 4.2 which is used in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ, A;Γ −→ C and Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C . See
Appendix A for details. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By nested induction on the structure of the cut-formula A, the proof D of Ψ ;Γ −→ A, and the
proof E of Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C or Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ C . See Appendix A for details. 
The proof of Theorem 4.1 illustrates that the rule ⊃L′ must have Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B −→ A, instead of Ψ ;Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ A, as its
ﬁrst premise. (Otherwise the proof of Theorem 4.1 fails.)
5. Natural deduction system N↑↓
This section derives a natural deduction system N↑↓ from the sequent calculus S . We use a hypothetical judgment of
the form Ψ ;Γ  J with the following assumption:
• A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A⇑ belonging to the next inner region. As in S , we assume that it is copied
to all further inner regions as well.
• A in Γ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A↓ belonging to the reference region.
• J is a semi-normality judgment C⇑, a neutrality judgment C↓, or a normality judgment C↑, all belonging to the
reference region.
Fig. 2 shows the rules in N↑↓ . Except for the rules Hyp and Hyp′ which reﬂect the deﬁnition of the hypothetical judgment
Ψ ;Γ  J , each rule has its counterpart in S . For example, the rules ↓↑ and ↓⇑ correspond to the rules Init and Init′ ,
respectively. An introduction rule (e.g., I↑) corresponds to a right rule (e.g., R) and an elimination rule (e.g., E↓) to left
rules (e.g., L and L′).
Proposition 5.1 states a general property of hypothetical judgments in N↑↓ . In the ﬁrst clause, we prove Ψ ; ·  A⇑,
instead of Ψ ;Γ  A⇑, because A in Ψ, A;Γ  J denotes A⇑ belonging to the next inner region. Theorem 5.4 follows from
Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3, and proves that S and N↑↓ are equivalent.
Proposition 5.1.
If Ψ ; ·  A⇑ and Ψ, A;Γ  J , then Ψ ;Γ  J .
If Ψ ;Γ  A↓ and Ψ ;Γ, A  J , then Ψ ;Γ  J .
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ, A;Γ  J and Ψ ;Γ, A  J . 
Lemma 5.2.
If Ψ ;Γ −→ C , then Ψ ;Γ  C↑.
If Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C , then Ψ ;Γ  C⇑.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ ;Γ −→ C and Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C . 
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Ψ ; ·  A⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A true I
Ψ ;Γ  A true Ψ, A;Γ  C true
Ψ ;Γ  C true E
Ψ ;Γ, A  B true
Ψ ;Γ  A ⊃ B true ⊃I
Ψ ;Γ  A ⊃ B true Ψ ;Γ  A true
Ψ ;Γ  B true ⊃E
Fig. 3. Rules new to the natural deduction system Ntrue .
Lemma 5.3.
If Ψ ;Γ  A↓, then Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C implies Ψ ;Γ −→ C.
If Ψ ;Γ  A↓, then Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ C implies Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C.
If Ψ ;Γ  A↑, then Ψ ;Γ −→ A.
If Ψ ;Γ  A⇑, then Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ ;Γ  A↓, Ψ ;Γ  A↑, and Ψ ;Γ  A⇑. See Appendix A
for details. 
Theorem 5.4 (S = N↑↓ ).
Ψ ;Γ −→ C if and only if Ψ ;Γ  C↑.
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C if and only if Ψ ;Γ  C⇑.
6. Natural deduction system Ntrue
This section presents a natural deduction system Ntrue which is equivalent to N
↑↓
 , but allows us to deduce truth judg-
ments. Deriving Ntrue from N
↑↓
 is analogous to deriving Ntrue from N↑↓ , but more involved because truth judgments coexist
with normality judgments and semi-normality judgments in Ntrue whereas only truth judgments exist in Ntrue .
As it is concerned with deducing truth judgments, Ntrue needs another hypothetical judgment of the form Ψ ;Γ  C true.
As in N↑↓ , we interpret A in Ψ as a hypothesis of A⇑ belonging to the next inner region. A in Γ , however, is interpreted
as a hypothesis of A true instead of a (stronger) hypothesis of A↓. Hence the meaning of Γ in Ψ ;Γ  J now depends on
whether J is a truth judgment or not.
• A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A⇑ belonging to the next inner region as well as all further inner regions.
• For J = C true, we interpret A in Γ as a hypothesis of A true belonging to the reference region.
• For J = C⇑, C↓, or C↑, we interpret A in Γ as a hypothesis of A↓ belonging to the reference region.
• J may be any judgment and belongs to the reference region.
We obtain Ntrue from the rules in N
↑↓
 by rewriting both A↑ and A↓ as A true, thereby collapsing the distinction between
A↑ and A↓. Fig. 3 shows the rules in Ntrue obtained from N↑↓ in this way. The rule Hyp′′ expresses that Γ in Ψ ;Γ  C true
denotes hypotheses of truth judgments. Note that the rule ↓⇑ in N↑↓ does not give rise to a new rule
Ψ ;Γ  A true
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑ true⇑,
which does not make sense because Γ in the premise, which denotes hypotheses of truth judgments, is incompatible
with Γ in the conclusion, which denotes hypotheses of neutrality judgments.
Ntrue also subsumes N
↑↓
 as a subsystem, i.e., it includes all the rules in N
↑↓
 . Note that the presence of the rule I
leads Ntrue to include those rules in N
↑↓
 for deducing semi-normality judgments. ↓⇑ is such a rule, whose premise deduces
a neutrality judgment. Therefore Ntrue includes those rules in N
↑↓
 for deducing neutrality judgments as well. An example of
such a rule is ⊃E↓ , whose second premise deduces a normality judgment. Therefore Ntrue also includes those rules in N↑↓
for deducing normality judgments. Thus Ntrue inherits all the rules from N
↑↓
 .
Since no rule in Fig. 3 deduces a normality or semi-normality judgment while Ntrue subsumes N
↑↓
 as a subsystem,
Theorem 5.4 continues to hold for Ntrue . Theorem 6.2 proves the equivalence between S and Ntrue . In conjunction with
Theorem 5.4, it proves the equivalence between normality judgments and truth judgments as stated in Corollary 6.3, which
resolves Conjecture 2.2.
Lemma 6.1.
If Ψ ;Γ  C↑, then Ψ ;Γ  C true.
If Ψ ;Γ  C↓, then Ψ ;Γ  C true.
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Theorem 6.2 (S = Ntrue ). Ψ ;Γ −→ C if and only if Ψ ;Γ  C true.
Proof. The only if part follows from Theorem 5.4 and Lemma 6.1. The proof of the if part proceeds by induction on the
structure of the proof of Ψ ;Γ  C true. We show two important cases.
Case
Ψ ; ·  C ′⇑
Ψ ;Γ  C ′ true I where C = C
′
Ψ ; · ⇒ C ′ from Theorem 5.4 and Ψ ; ·  C ′⇑
Ψ ;Γ −→ C ′ by the rule R
Case
Ψ ;Γ  A true Ψ, A;Γ  C true
Ψ ;Γ  C true E
Ψ, A;Γ −→ C by IH on Ψ, A;Γ  C true
Ψ, A;Γ,A −→ C by weakening
Ψ ;Γ,A −→ C by the rule L
Ψ ;Γ −→ A by IH on Ψ ;Γ  A true
Ψ ;Γ −→ C by applying Theorem 4.1 to Ψ ;Γ −→ A and Ψ ;Γ,A −→ C
Corollary 6.3 (N↑↓ = Ntrue ). Ψ ;Γ  C↑ if and only if Ψ ;Γ  C true.
We can also explain the relationship between truth judgments and semi-normality judgments. Intuitively a proof of
A true implies (but does not directly assert) the existence of a proof of a normality judgment A↑ whereas a proof of
A⇑ does not. Hence, whenever A true is provable, A⇑ is also provable. Suppose ·; ·  A true. By Theorem 6.2, it implies
·; · −→ A, which in turn implies ·; · ⇒ A by Proposition 3.3. By Theorem 5.4, we conclude ·; ·  A⇑. The converse does
not hold, however. For example, ·; ·  A ⊃ A⇑ is provable, but ·; ·  A ⊃ A true is not:
·;A  A↓ Hyp
′
A;A  A⇑ Hyp
·;A  A⇑ E↓
·; ·  A ⊃ A⇑ ⊃I⇑
·;A  A true Hyp
′′ ???
A;A  A true
·;A  A true E
·; ·  A ⊃ A true ⊃I
If A⇑ is provable while A true is not, we have evidence of the truth of A, but its proof does not have a corresponding
normal proof. In such a case, we may internalize A⇑ within a truth judgment A true, which is guaranteed to have
a normal proof. For example, provability of A ⊃ A⇑ is concisely expressed by a truth judgment (A ⊃ A) true.
We close this section by summarizing properties of Ntrue in an axiomatic style:
• (A ⊃ A) true is provable (U).
• A ⊃ A true is provable (4).
• (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) true is not provable (K).
• A ⊃ A true is not provable (T).
• If A true is provable, then A true is provable.
• If A ⊃ A true is provable, then A true is provable.
The last two statements are metalogical properties of Ntrue , which we prove in Propositions 6.4 and 6.5.
Proposition 6.4. If A true is provable, then A true is provable.
Proof. By Theorem 6.2, it suﬃces to prove that ·; · −→ A implies ·; · −→ A. Suppose ·; · −→ A. By Proposition 3.3, we
have ·; · ⇒ A. By applying the rule R, we obtain ·; · −→ A. 
Proposition 6.5. If A ⊃ A true is provable, then A true is provable.
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following form:
D·;A −→ A
·; · −→ A ⊃ A ⊃R
Suppose that A in ·;A −→ A is required in the proof D. Then we eventually apply the rule L to decompose A and
then apply the rule Sub as follows:
Ψ ′, A;Γ ′ ⇒ A Sub
... } E
Ψ, A;A,Γ −→ C
Ψ ;A,Γ −→ C L
... } E ′
·;A −→ A
·; · −→ A ⊃ A ⊃R
Here we assume that the rule L is not applied again in E to decompose A. Note that E ′ must contain only applications
of the rules L, ⊃L, and ⊃R, and no application of the rule R, in the presence of which we cannot apply the rule L or
L′ to decompose A. Because of the subformula property of the sequent calculus S , all formulae in Ψ , Ψ ′ , Γ , and Γ ′ as
well as the formula C are subformulae of A. (We have Ψ ⊆ Ψ ′ , but Γ is not necessarily a subset of Γ ′ .)
Now observe that no right rule (R, R′ , ⊃R, and ⊃R′) appears in E because C is a subformula of A. Therefore E
may apply only the rules L′ and ⊃L′ , which contradicts the assumption that it terminates with a sequent of the form
Ψ ′′;Γ ′′ −→ C (where Ψ ′′ = Ψ, A and Γ ′′ = A,Γ ). Hence A in ·;A −→ A is unnecessary in the proof of D and there
exists a proof of ·; · −→ A. 
7. Conclusion
We present a system of modal logic that extends a fragment of propositional logic with the implication connective ⊃
and uses a novel modality  to express the notion of normal proof within the system itself. A sequent calculus is developed
to ensure that the system is sound, and then equivalent natural deduction systems are derived. The main obstacle to
developing the system is to identify a form of sequent that reﬂects the self-referential nature of truth judgments and
normality judgments. We ﬁnd that only semi-normality judgments, which are a weaker form of normality judgments, can
be internalized within truth judgments using .
Future work includes extending our system to full propositional logic and ﬁrst-order logic, which do not require addi-
tional forms of sequents or hypothetical judgments. As the present work uses a purely proof-theoretic approach, a model-
theoretic account of the modality  is another direction to pursue.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ, A;Γ −→ C and Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C .
Case
C atomic
Ψ, A;Γ ′,C −→ C Init where Γ = Γ
′,C
Ψ ;Γ ′,C −→ C by rule the Init
Case
Ψ, A, B;Γ ′,B −→ C
Ψ, A;Γ ′,B −→ C L where Γ = Γ
′,B
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B −→ C by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ ′,B −→ C by the rule L
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Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1 Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 −→ C
Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ C ⊃L
where Γ = Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1 by IH on the left premise
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 −→ C by IH on the right premise
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ C by the rule ⊃L
Case
Ψ, A; · ⇒ C ′
Ψ, A;Γ −→ C ′ R where C = C
′
Ψ ; · ⇒ C ′ by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ −→ C ′ by the rule R
Case
Ψ, A;Γ,C1 −→ C2
Ψ, A;Γ −→ C1 ⊃ C2 ⊃R where C = C1 ⊃ C2
Ψ ;Γ,C1 −→ C2 by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ −→ C1 ⊃ C2 by the rule ⊃R
Case
C atomic
Ψ, A;Γ ′,C ⇒ C Init
′ where Γ = Γ ′,C
Ψ ;Γ ′,C ⇒ C by rule the Init′
Case Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ A Sub where C = A
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A by weakening Ψ ; · ⇒ A
Case Ψ ′,C, A;Γ ⇒ C Sub where C = A and Ψ = Ψ ′,C
Ψ ′,C;Γ ⇒ C by the rule Sub
Case
Ψ, A, B;Γ ′,B ⇒ C
Ψ, A;Γ ′,B ⇒ C L
′ where Γ = Γ ′,B
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B ⇒ C by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ ′,B ⇒ C by the rule L′
Case
Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1 Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 ⇒ C
Ψ, A;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 ⇒ C ⊃L
′
where Γ = Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1 by IH on the left premise
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 ⇒ C by IH on the right premise
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 ⇒ C by the rule ⊃L′
Case
Ψ, A; · ⇒ C ′
Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C ′ R
′ where C = C ′
Ψ ; · ⇒ C ′ by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C ′ by the rule R′
Case
Ψ, A;Γ,C1 ⇒ C2
Ψ, A;Γ ⇒ C1 ⊃ C2 ⊃R
′ where C = C1 ⊃ C2
Ψ ;Γ,C1 ⇒ C2 by IH on the premise
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C1 ⊃ C2 by the rule ⊃R′
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By nested induction on the structure of the cut-formula A, the proof D of Ψ ;Γ −→ A, and the
proof E of Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C or Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ C .
When applying induction hypothesis, we implicitly weaken sequents if necessary. For example, we apply induction hy-
pothesis on a formula A, a proof of Ψ ;Γ −→ A, and a proof of Ψ ;Γ, A, B −→ C to obtain a proof of Ψ ;Γ, B −→ C , where
we implicitly weaken Ψ ;Γ −→ A to Ψ ;Γ, B −→ A. Note that since weakening a sequent does not change the size of its
proof, we may still apply induction hypothesis after weakening sequents.
First we consider cases for deducing Ψ ;Γ −→ C .
Case D = A atomic
Ψ ;Γ ′, A −→ A Init where Γ = Γ
′, A
Ψ ;Γ ′, A −→ C by contraction on E :: Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A −→ C
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Ψ ;Γ, A −→ A Init where C = A
Ψ ;Γ −→ A from D and C = A
Case E = C atomic
Ψ ;Γ ′,C, A −→ C Init where Γ = Γ
′,C
Ψ ;Γ ′,C −→ C by the rule Init
Suppose that A is the principal formula of the last inference rules in both D and E .
Case D =
D′
Ψ ; · ⇒ A′
Ψ ;Γ −→ A′ R
and E =
E ′
Ψ, A′;Γ,A′ −→ C
Ψ ;Γ,A′ −→ C L
where A = A′
E ′′ :: Ψ, A′;Γ −→ C by IH on A′ , D, and E ′
Ψ ;Γ −→ C by applying Theorem 4.2 to D′ and E ′′
Case D =
D′
Ψ ;Γ, A1 −→ A2
Ψ ;Γ −→ A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃R
and E =
E1
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2 −→ A1
E2
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2, A2 −→ C
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2 −→ C ⊃L
where A = A1 ⊃ A2
E ′1 :: Ψ ;Γ −→ A1 by IH on A1 ⊃ A2, D, and E1
D′′ :: Ψ ;Γ −→ A2 by IH on A1, E ′1, and D′
E ′2 :: Ψ ;Γ, A2 −→ C by IH on A1 ⊃ A2, D, and E2
Ψ ;Γ −→ C by IH on A2, D ′′ , and E ′2
Suppose that A is not the principal formula of the last inference rule in D.
Case D =
D′
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B −→ A
Ψ ;Γ ′,B −→ A L
where Γ = Γ ′,B
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B −→ C by IH on A, D′ , and E
Ψ ;Γ ′,B −→ C by the rule L
Case D =
D1
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1
D2
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 −→ A
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ A ⊃L
where Γ = Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2
E ′ :: Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 −→ C by IH on A, D2, and E
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ C by the rule ⊃L on D1 and E ′
Suppose that A is not the principal formula of the last inference rule in E .
Case E =
E ′
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B, A −→ C
Ψ ;Γ ′,B, A −→ C L
where Γ = Γ ′,B
Ψ, B;Γ ′,B −→ C by IH on A, D, and E ′
Ψ ;Γ ′,B −→ C by the rule L
Case E =
E1
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, A −→ B1
E2
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, A, B2 −→ C
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, A −→ C ⊃L
where Γ = Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2
E ′1 :: Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ B1 by IH on A, D, and E1
E ′2 :: Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2, B2 −→ C by IH on A, D, and E2
Ψ ;Γ ′, B1 ⊃ B2 −→ C by the rule ⊃L on E ′ and E ′1 2
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E ′
Ψ ; · ⇒ C ′
Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C ′ R
where C = C ′
Ψ ;Γ −→ C ′ by the rule R on E ′
Case E =
E ′
Ψ ;Γ, A,C1 −→ C2
Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C1 ⊃ C2 ⊃R
where C = C1 ⊃ C2
Ψ ;Γ,C1 −→ C2 by IH on A, D, and E ′
Ψ ;Γ −→ C1 ⊃ C2 by the rule ⊃R
Next we consider cases for deducing Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C .
Case D = A atomic
Ψ ;Γ ′, A −→ A Init where Γ = Γ
′, A
Ψ ;Γ ′, A ⇒ C by contraction on E :: Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A ⇒ C
Case E = A atomic
Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ A Init′ where C = A
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A by applying Proposition 3.3 to D
Case E = C atomic
Ψ ;Γ ′,C, A ⇒ C Init
′ where Γ = Γ ′,C
Ψ ;Γ ′,C ⇒ C by the rule Init
Case E = Ψ ′,C;Γ, A ⇒ C Sub where Ψ = Ψ ′,C
Ψ ′,C;Γ ⇒ C by the rule Sub
Suppose that A is the principal formula of the last inference rules in both D and E .
Case D =
D′
Ψ ; · ⇒ A′
Ψ ;Γ −→ A′ R
and E =
E ′
Ψ, A′;Γ,A′ ⇒ C
Ψ ;Γ,A′ ⇒ C L
′
where A = A′
E ′′ : Ψ, A′;Γ ⇒ C by IH on A′ , D, and E ′
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C by applying Theorem 4.2 to D′ and E ′′
Case D =
D′
Ψ ;Γ, A1 −→ A2
Ψ ;Γ −→ A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃R
and E =
E1
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2 −→ A1
E2
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2, A2 ⇒ C
Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⊃ A2 ⇒ C ⊃L
′
where A = A1 ⊃ A2
E ′1 :: Ψ ;Γ −→ A1 by IH on A1 ⊃ A2, D, and E1D′ :: Ψ ;Γ −→ A2 by IH on A1, E ′1, and D′E ′2 :: Ψ ;Γ, A2 ⇒ C by IH on A1 ⊃ A2, D, and E2
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C by IH on A2, D′ , and E ′2
We omit all remaining cases which are similar to those cases for deducing Ψ ;Γ −→ C . 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof D of Ψ ;Γ  A↓, Ψ ;Γ  A↑, and
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑.
Case D = Ψ ′, A;Γ  A⇑ Hyp where Ψ = Ψ ′, A
Ψ ′, A;Γ ⇒ A by the rule Sub
Case D = Ψ ;Γ ′, A  A↓ Hyp
′
where Γ = Γ ′, A
Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A −→ C assumption
Ψ ;Γ ′, A −→ C by contraction on Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A −→ C
Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A ⇒ C assumption
Ψ ;Γ ′, A ⇒ C by contraction on Ψ ;Γ ′, A, A ⇒ C
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D′
Ψ ;Γ  A↓
Ψ ;Γ  A↑ ↓↑ (A atomic)
E :: Ψ ;Γ, A −→ A by the rule Init
Ψ ;Γ −→ A by IH on D′ with E
Case D =
D′
Ψ ;Γ  A↓
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑ ↓⇑ (A atomic)
E :: Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ A by the rule Init′
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A by IH on D′ with E
Case D =
D′
Ψ ; ·  A′⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A′ ↑ I↑
where A = A′
E :: Ψ ; · ⇒ A′ by IH on D′
Ψ ;Γ −→ A′ by the rule R on E
Case D =
D′
Ψ ; ·  A′⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A′⇑ I⇑
where A = A′
E :: Ψ ; · ⇒ A′ by IH on D′
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A′ by the rule R′ on E
Case D =
D1
Ψ ;Γ  B↓
D2
Ψ, B;Γ  A↑
Ψ ;Γ  A↑ E↓
E :: Ψ, B;Γ −→ A by IH on D2
E ′ :: Ψ, B;Γ,B −→ A by weakening E
E ′′ :: Ψ ;Γ,B −→ A by the rule L on E ′
Ψ ;Γ −→ A by IH on D1 with E ′′
Case D =
D1
Ψ ;Γ  B↓
D2
Ψ, B;Γ  A⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A⇑ E↓
E :: Ψ, B;Γ ⇒ A by IH on D2
E ′ :: Ψ, B;Γ,B ⇒ A by weakening E
E ′′ :: Ψ ;Γ,B ⇒ A by the rule L′ on E ′
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A by IH on D1 with E ′′
Case D =
D′
Ψ ;Γ, A1  A2↑
Ψ ;Γ  A1 ⊃ A2↑ ⊃I↑
where A = A1 ⊃ A2
E :: Ψ ;Γ, A1 −→ A2 by IH on D′
Ψ ;Γ −→ A1 ⊃ A2 by the rule ⊃R on E
Case D =
D′
Ψ ;Γ, A1  A2⇑
Ψ ;Γ  A1 ⊃ A2⇑ ⊃I⇑
where A = A1 ⊃ A2
E :: Ψ ;Γ, A1 ⇒ A2 by IH on D′
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ A1 ⊃ A2 by the rule ⊃R′ on E
Case D =
D1
Ψ ;Γ  B ⊃ A↓
D2
Ψ ;Γ  B↑
Ψ ;Γ  A↓ ⊃E↓
E1 :: Ψ ;Γ −→ B by IH on D2
E ′1 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A −→ B by weakening E1
E2 :: Ψ ;Γ, A −→ C assumption
E ′2 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A, A −→ C by weakening E2
E3 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A −→ C by the rule ⊃L on E ′1 and E ′2
Ψ ;Γ −→ C by IH on D1 with E3
S. Park, H. Im / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1519–1535 1535E1 :: Ψ ;Γ −→ B by IH on D2
E ′1 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A −→ B by weakening E1E2 :: Ψ ;Γ, A ⇒ C assumption
E ′2 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A, A ⇒ C by weakening E2E3 :: Ψ ;Γ, B ⊃ A ⇒ C by the rule ⊃L′ on E ′1 and E ′2
Ψ ;Γ ⇒ C by IH on D1 with E3
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